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This article compares elements of the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) 
and the United States Supreme Court (‘USSC’) to the issue of the separation of religion and state. It 
shows how the European experience of such issues can help to demonstrate which are the more 
compelling, and the less compelling justifications for such separation. It argues that, a comparison 
between key decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the United States Supreme Court 
reveals rights-based justifications for strict separation of religion and state to be relatively weak. It 
argues that rights-based separation will not rule out non-oppressive forms of establishment of 
religion and place pressure on courts to enter into risky assessments of the compatibility of 
teachings of particular faiths with fundamental rights. This casts doubt on the theories advanced by 
several influential proponents of a maximalist reading of the separationist requirements of the First 
Amendment as well as explaining some of the problematic elements of Strasbourg jurisprudence 
such as the tendency of the Court to make pronouncements on the compatibility of Islam with 
human rights norms. 
The European Court of Human Rights as a Useful Comparator 
Separation of religion and state, by which I mean both the idea of secular politics (the need for law 
and policy to be justified by non-religious, “public” reasons) and symbolic neutrality (the need for 
the state to avoid appearing to endorse the truth claims of a particular faith) has been one of the 
most controversial issues in US constitutional law for a number of decades. The requirements of the 
1st Amendment prohibition on the establishment of a religion has generated a large number of US 
Supreme Court judgments and an enormous volume of scholarship.1 Pan-European Courts have only 
                                                          
1 This scholarship includes a large number of books about the relationship between religion, state and law in 
general but which focus largely on the US Constitution. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. TREMBLAY AND 
THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, (2011) (3rd ed.), MICHAEL S. ARIENS AND ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (2002) (2nd ed. 2002), JOHN T. NOONAN JR. AND EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY JR., 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT, (2010) (3rd 
ed.), Micah J. Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special? 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). 
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become engaged on these issues in the last two decades. Although the status of religion within the 
legal order of the European Union has been controversial from time to time,2 the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg has dealt with these issues only indirectly.3 In contrast, the European Court of Human 
Rights has become an important centre of conflict on the key issues in this area. The Strasbourg 
Court has opined on the compatibility of theocratic politics with the Convention,4 the teaching of 
religion in state schools,5 the exclusion of religious symbols from particular contexts6 and, perhaps 
most famously, the presence of religious symbols in state schools7 (the Court has also issued a major 
decision on the relationship between freedom of conscience and anti-discrimination rules8 but that 
question is not the focus of this article). This caselaw has generated a substantial literature9 and has 
allowed the contours limits placed on the relationship between religion and the state by pan-
European legal commitments, to become significantly clearer. 
European and American courts approach the question of separation between religion and state in a 
context of definite differences but also of great similarities. The two legal systems broadly share the 
wider overall intellectual structure that characterises Western approaches to the role of religion in 
                                                          
2 Ronan McCrea, Religion as a Basis of Law and the Constitutional Order of the European Union , COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 16.1 (2009-2010), RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(2010), JOSEPH H. H. WEILER UN’EUROPA CRISTIANA: UN SAGGIO ESPLORATIVA (2003), GEORGE WEIGEL THE CUBE AND THE 
CATHEDRAL; EUROPE, AMERICA AND POLITICS WITHOUT GOD (2005). 
3 MCCREA, supra note 2 at chs. 3, 5 and 7. 
4 Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1. 
5 Folgerø v Norway (2007) 46 EHRR 1147, Grzelak v. Poland (Application 7710/02, Judgment of 15 June 2010), 
Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey(Application 1448/04, Judgement of 9 October 2007). 
6 Şahin v Turkey (20050 41 EHRR 8, Dahlab v Switzerland (Application No 42393/98) 15 February 2001, Dogru v 
France (2009) 49 EHRR 8. 
7 Lautsi v Italy (Grand Chamber) (2012) 54 EHRR 3.  
8 Eweida and Others v United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8.   
9 See for example, CAROLYN EVANS FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, (2001), 
JEROEN TEMPERMAN (ED.) THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
CLASSROOM (2012), Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Post Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How 
God Never Really Went Away, Mod. L. Rev. 75: 1064-1098 (2012). 
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public life that assumes the existence of separate categories of religious” and political”.10 However, 
they also approach the judicial regulation of particular conflicts that arise in relation to issues such as 
symbolic endorsement of a faith by a state, or the need for laws to be justified by public reason from 
somewhat different starting points. These differences can, I suggest, be most instructive and can 
allow each system to obtain provide valuable clarification of the true principles underlying the 
separation of religion and state.  
Indeed, while the fact that the European Court of Human Rights is an international court of limited 
remit may appear to weigh against recognising its jurisprudence as an informative comparator in 
relation to the US Supreme Court, which has greater democratic authority and a broader 
constitutional role, it is the limited nature of Strasbourg’s remit that allows it to provide insight into 
important issues in First Amendment caselaw. This is because the ECtHR’s concerns are limited to 
preventing the violation of fundamental rights. Although the Court has stated that democracy is the 
only system envisaged by the Convention and has noted the importance of pluralism and the idea of 
‘democratic society’,11 it does not have a mandate to set out or enforce desirable constitutional 
principles. Its only task is to rule on whether a particular action or legal arrangement on the part of a 
signatory state violates the rights set out in the Convention. As McCrea writes:  
‘Certainly, the reasons given for [the Court’s] decision can be illuminating as to broad constitutional 
principles and may provide a degree of guidance to decision makers in other situations, but the fact 
remains that the ultimate decision is binary: violation or no violation […] Strasbourg does not lay 
down rules about what ought to be, only what ought not to be’.12  
Unlike the US Supreme Court (or indeed the Court of Justice of the European Union)13 the Strasbourg 
Court has no authority to develop broader constitutional norms that aim at the proper functioning of 
the legal and political system or that seek to promote particular notions of citizenship or society.  
Therefore, when the ECtHR addresses the relationship between religion, state and law it has limited 
                                                          
10 On the development of a category of “religion” as a phenomenon distinct from politics see, for example, 
KAREN ARMSTRONG FIELDS OF BLOOD: RELIGION AND THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE (2014), MARK LILLA THE STILLBORN GOD: 
RELIGION, POLITICS AND THE MODERN WEST (2007), CHARLES TAYLOR, A Secular Age (2007). 
11 See  Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1 paras. 86-90 and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova 
(2002) 35 EHRR 306 para. 114. 
12 Ronan McCrea, Singing from the Same Hymn Sheet? What the Differences between the Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg Courts Tell Us about Religious Freedom, Non-Discrimination and the Secular State 5 Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion 183, 188 (2016). 
13 Ibid., 192-93. 
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capacities to deal with elements of this relationship that go beyond individual rights. As Judge 
Bonello pointed out in his concurring opinion in the Grand Chamber decision in Lautsi v Italy, the 
Convention has given the Court the remit to enforce freedom of religion and of conscience but has 
not empowered it to enforce either secularism or religious neutrality on states. He pointed out that:  
‘Freedom of religion is not secularism. Freedom of religion is not the separation of church and state. 
Freedom of religion is not religious equidistance –all seductive notions, but of which no one has so 
far appointed this Court to be custodian. In Europe, secularism is an optional, freedom of religion is 
not’.14  
Non rights-based reasons can be recognised only indirectly by the ECtHR in that, as is discussed 
below, signatory states may seek to justify restrictions on religious freedom (or other Convention 
rights) on the basis that the restriction in question seeks to protect important constitutional 
principles or goals arising from national legal orders which cover much wider ground than the ECHR, 
but this recognition, is a mechanism for the Court to accommodate the broader constitutional 
choices of Member States and does not permit the Court itself to develop and impose constitutional 
principles that go beyond the question of the protection of fundamental rights.  
This incapacity is what makes the Strasbourg Court such a useful comparator. The extent to which 
individual rights claims can justify the relatively strict separation between religion and state (both in 
terms of a requirement that government actions be supported by secular or non-religious reasons 
and in terms of prohibition on symbolic state endorsement of a faith) that has been required by the 
US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment is of considerable importance in 
academic debate and in the Court’s caselaw. As will be discussed below, the USSC has ruled that the 
state cannot symbolically endorse any particular faith but has been unclear about the degree to 
which this principle arises from need to protect individual rights or from broader, more 
pragmatically justified constitutional principles such as the risk of religious contestation for political 
power. This is mirrored in academic debates in academic debates where scholars such as Ronald 
Dworkin15 Sager and Eisgruber16 and Martha Nussbaum17 have spoken of the sense of alienation, 
exclusion or inferiority that may be produced when individuals see state endorsement of a faith they 
do not share but it is not clear whether this sense of alienation or inferiority is itself a rights violation 
                                                          
14 Lautsi v Italy supra note 7, concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, para. 2.6. 
15 RONALD DWORKIN RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013). 
16 CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER AND LAWRENCE SAGER RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) at 52. 
17 MARTHA NUSSBAUM POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE, (2013) at 5-7. 
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or whether it is problematic for other reasons. Indeed, as will be discussed below, other figures have 
pointedly questioned whether rights claims can provide adequate justification for the degree of 
separation between religion and state argued for by both Dworkin and Nussbaum.  
Therefore, because it is restricted to dealing with rights issues, the ECtHR can be a particularly 
informative comparator for the USSC. The fact the the First Amendment of the US Constitution 
contains both an individual right to religious freedom and an abstract prohibition on establishment 
means that in cases where a form of state endorsement is found to violate the Constitution it may 
not be clear what role individual rights claims and abstract constitutional principles each played. The 
same will not be true of Strasbourg’s religion-state jurisprudence where the Court is largely 
restricted to rights questions. Its caselaw shows more clearly than other courts what role rights do 
and do not play in cases on separation of religion and state. 
Indeed, only a court with such a limited remit can provide this insight. National courts dealing with 
religious matters will face the same overlap between questions of rights and broader constitutional 
principles that faces the USSC. French courts will have to assess cases in the light of commitments to 
religious freedom alongside the 1905 law on secularism and cross cutting issues such as particular 
ideas of citizenship and national identity, similarly German courts will have to take into account both 
commitments to religious freedom and specific constitutional provisions on church state relations. 
Even in the UK where the Anglican Church is established in England and where there is no codified 
constitution, the courts have have issued judgements on religion and its role in law and politics that 
speak of a form of substantive separation between religion and the legal and political order that has 
been justified in a leading judgement of the Court of Appeal on grounds that: 
‘We do not live in a society where all people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one 
religion –any belief system- cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the 
general law than the precepts of any other. If they did, those out in the cold would be less than 
citizens, and our constitution would be on the way to a theocracy.’18 
Notably, this approach that also leaves unclear whether the status of being ‘out in the cold’ is itself a 
rights violation or whether it is problematic for some other reason such as the likelihood that such 
alienation would provoke intractable political conflict.  
Of course, as it is an international court the ECtHR is likely to be more deferential to state choices 
than the court of a nation state such as the USSC. However, this article’s focus is not on the intensity 
                                                          
18 MacFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd. [2010] EWCA Civ 880, Laws LJ. This statement has been repeated verbatim by 
the Court of Appeal in later cases. 
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of review applied but rather what work ideas of religious freedom and individual rights do and do 
not do when courts are faced with disputes relating to the degree of separation from religion that 
states are required to observe. Indeed, other international courts such as the Court of Justice of the 
European Union that have broader remits than the ECtHR will also approach matters of state 
religious neutrality in a way that requires them to take account of the broader constitutional norms 
of the political system of the EU meaning their decisions cannot provide the same degree of insight 
as to the role (and limits of the role) of rights in these debates as can the caselaw of the Strasbourg 
Court.  
Textual Differences but Similar Approaches 
In textual terms, there are clear differences between the ECHR and the United States Constitution. 
The First Amendment of the US Constitution covers both freedom of religion and the separation of 
church and state. The European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) has Article 9 guaranteeing 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion but does not have an article requiring separation of 
church and state, something that makes the justification for interventions to support the secular 
nature of the state more complicated. 
Despite these textual differences, both systems require limits on religious influence over law and 
politics. The USSC has required ‘valid secular reasons’ if legislation is to be held to be valid as part of 
a broader commitment to avoiding the “entanglement” of religion and the state.19 The European 
Court of Human Rights has approvingly mentioned the concept of secularism as being in harmony 
with the ECHR.20 However it has focused, in decisions such as Refah Partisi v Turkey21 (where it 
upheld the dissolution of a political party held to be seeking the establishment of a religiously-based 
legal order), on showing the danger to norms such a privacy, popular sovereignty and equality that 
the establishment of a non-secular legal or political order would bring (in this case an Islamic, Sharia-
based order).  
As will be shown below, the European approach is underpinned by concerns that certain forms of 
endorsement of religion by the state may be oppressive and that the legal enforcement of particular 
religious values may be undemocratic or inconsistent with particular human rights such as privacy or 
equality. The US approach has, at least until recently, differed in that it has also been concerned with 
                                                          
19  See for example, Stone v Graham 449 US 39 (1980). 
20 See Refah Partisi v Turkey (not 4 supra.). 
21 Ibid. 
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avoiding entanglement of religion and state irrespective of whether the entanglement in question 
could be seen as oppressive or not. There has been lively academic debate over whether the singling 
out of religious values alone for exclusion from acting as the basis of public policy is justifiable22 but 
the general approach of the majority in the USSC has (at least until recently) been to identify 
religious values per se, irrespective of their content as ineligible to act as the basis of law and policy 
and to see symbolic endorsement of a faith as problematic whether or not its overall effect is 
oppressive (see discussion below).  
Separation of Religion and State under the ECHR 
Cases on the issue of the religious neutrality of the state that have come before the Strasbourg Court 
have taken two forms. One has consisted of challenges to state practices or symbolic arrangements 
that depart from the principle of religious neutrality or separation of religion and state. The other 
has been made up of challenges to state actions that have as their aim the protection of the secular 
nature of state bodies or institutions (for example by prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols in 
state institutions). 
(a) Strasbourg’s Non-Establishment: What Kind of Separation between Religion and State Is 
Required by the ECHR? 
The Court’s record in the first category of cases, where an individual challenges symbolic 
arrangements in state contexts on the ground that they depart from the principle of separation of 
religion and state in a way that violates the Convention, is mixed. In Buscarini v San Marino,23 the 
Court found a violation of Article 9 in the case of a challenge to the traditional oath required of those 
elected to the San Marinese parliament which required legislators to swear “on the Holy Gospels”. 
The Court rejected arguments that this oath was merely a national tradition and found that forcing 
legislators to pronounce a religious oath amounted to a violation of their freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.24  
                                                          
22 See for example, Juergen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination (2003) 1(1) INT’L. J. OF CONST. L. (I.CON) 2, 
Michael W. McConnell The Problem of Singling Out Religion 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000), Abner S. Greene, ‘The 
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses’ 102 Yale Law Journal 1611 (1993), JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
(1993) and KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988). See also the judgment of Laws LJ 
in the English and Welsh Court of Appeal in MacFarlane v RELATE Avon [2010] EWCA Civ. 771. 
23 Buscarini v San Marino (app 24645/94) ECHR 18 February 1999. 
24 Ibid. paragraphs 38 and 39. 
8 
 
Similarly in Dimitras v Greece it found a violation of Article 9 in respect of rules for giving testimony 
in criminal cases. The relevant legislation assumed as a default that witnesses were Greek Orthodox 
and, in the case of those who followed a religion unrecognised by the state or who had no religion, 
the individual in question was required to convince the court that they held such beliefs before 
being allowed to make a solemn affirmation instead of swearing on the Bible. Justifying its 
conclusion that these rules violated the Convention, the Court noted the presumption that witnesses 
were Orthodox and the fact that the option of making a solemn declaration instead of swearing on 
the Bible was not given to Greek Orthodox individuals who preferred that option. It particularly 
objected to the fact that witnesses were obliged to reveal their religion to judges and noted that, 
should a judge fail to be convinced by a witness’ evidence that she was an atheist or member of a 
religion that forbids the taking of oaths, she would be forced to swear on the Bible.  
Worries that entanglement between the state and a favoured faith could become oppressive is also 
seen in a series of cases related to the teaching of religion in state schools where the Court found 
violations of the Convention where a mandatory curriculum endorsed the truth claims of a particular 
faith or when opt out mechanisms tended to disfavour or place pressure on students from other 
faiths.25 Importantly, absolute equal treatment of all religions was not required. In Folgerø v. 
Norway, for example, the Court did not object to the the fact that Christianity, Norway’s dominant 
religion, received a disproportionately large amount of attention in the curriculum, but rather to the 
fact that the course appeared to present the teachings of Christianity as true.26  
Institutional entanglement between religion and state is the rule rather than the exception in 
Europe27 and the Court has found that establishment of a particular religion as the official religion of 
the state does not per se violate the Convention.28 However, it has found violations where close 
entanglement between a particular faith and the state reaches a point where it becomes oppressive 
of religious freedom and religious pluralism. A version of the kind of mild establishment’ that Ahdar 
                                                          
25 Folgerø v. Norway (Application 15472/02, Judgement of 29 June 2007, Grand Chamber), Grzelak v. Poland 
(Application 7710/02, Judgement of 15 June 2010), Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey(Application 1448/04, 
Judgement of 9 October 2007). 
26 Ibid. 
27 JOHN MADELEY AND ZSOLT ENYEDI (EDS.) CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: THE CHIMERA OF NEUTRALITY (2003). 
28 Darby v Sweden (1990) 13 EHRR 773. 
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and Leigh argue is compatible with religious freedom29 was upheld by the Court in Lautsi v Italy. 
Here the Grand Chamber of the Court found that the presence of crucifixes in Italian state schools 
could not be said to violate the Convention as such crucifixes were merely passive symbols and, in 
the context of the Italian education system overall (which it found to be open to other faiths and 
where there was no indoctrination in favour of Catholicism), the overall effect of their presence was 
not oppressive.30  
On the other hand, the Court has also shown a general concern that excessively close entanglement 
between a particular faith and the state could reach a point where it becomes oppressive of 
institutional religious freedom and pluralism in general. In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and 
Others v Moldova31 the Court found a violation of Article 9 in circumstances where the Moldovan 
authorities had refused to recognise the applicant Church, arguing that it was in fact part of the 
officially recognised Metropolitan Church of Moldova which should be entrusted to resolve what 
was an internal disagreement within the Church. Although the ECtHR has been clear that absolute 
religious neutrality is not required by the Convention and states may recognise an official state 
religion, in this case it reiterated its repeatedly-stated view that when states seek to regulate 
religious activity they must act in an ‘impartial and neutral’ fashion32 and are precluded from 
assessing the legitimacy of religious beliefs.33 The Court linked the protection of the autonomous 
existence of religious communities to the broader notion of ‘preserving pluralism and democracy’ 
and repeated its statement from the earlier case of Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria34 that “the 
autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic 
society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords’.35 
                                                          
29 R Ahdar and I Leigh ‘Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?’ (2004) 49(3) McGill Law Journal 
635-681. 
30 Note 7 supra. paragaphs 72-76. 
31 (2002) 35 EHRR 306. 
32 Ibid,. paragraph 116. 
33 Ibid., paragraph 117. 
34 (2002) 34 EHRR 1339. In this case the Court also found a violation of Article 9 where the Bulgarian 
authorities had intervened in favour of one party to a dispute over the position of Chief Mufti in Bulgaria. The 
Court held that state action that forced religous groups to come together under a single leadership constituted 
a violation of Article 9 read in the light of Article 11 (freedom of association). 
35 Note 7 supra., paragraph 118. 
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Faced with a refusal of the Moldovan authorities to register the applicant church and allegations of 
serious harassment of church members, the Court set out clear limits on the powers of the state to 
regulate religious life stating that Article 9 precluded: 
‘State measures favouring a particular leader or specific organs of a divided religious community or 
seeking to compel the community or part of it to place itself, against its will, under a single 
leadership, would also constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion. In democratic societies 
the State does not need to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are 
brought under a unified leadership.’36 
The Court noted that under Moldovan law only recognised religions could be practised and that 
unrecognised religions could not obtain legal personality, engage clergy or sell religious items as 
well. It also noted serious allegations that the those belonging to applicant church had been subject 
to intimidation and harassment and found that the lack of legal recognition had aggravated this 
situation.37 
We can therefore see the outlines of a framework within which the ECtHR approaches the 
relationship between religion and state. Strict religious neutrality is not required by the Convention. 
States may symbolically associate themselves with a particular faith or give a culturally-entrenched 
faith particular prominence in the education system provided the overall effect is not oppressive of 
religious freedom. As Leigh and Ahdar rightly observe, the test is oppression not neutrality.38 The 
entanglement between religion and the state must be sufficiently intense so as to impose clear 
burdens on the free practise of religion in order for it to violate Article 9. The presence of a crucifix 
on the wall of a school may produce a sense of alienation but this will not violate the ECHR. The 
cases where a violation has been found have involved direct teaching of religious truth39 or the 
forcing of individuals to either recite a religious oath or publically justify their faith to a public 
official. In cases such as Hasan and Chaush and the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, the Court 
explicitly linked religious autonomy to the broader value of pluralism, but the actual reason the 
violation of the Convention was held to have occurred was the direct state interference with the 
exercise of institutional religious autonomy. Certainly, in the Moldovan case, the strong links 
                                                          
36 Ibid., paragraph 117 
37 Ibid., paragraph 129. 
38 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Post Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really 
Went Away, Mod. L. Rev. 75: 1064-1098 (2012). 
39 Folgerø note 5 supra. 
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between the state and the rival to the applicant church lay behind the failure of the State to 
recognise the latter and its toleration of acts of harassment and intimidation. However, it was the 
non-recognition and acts of intimidation that constituted the violation, not the existence of official 
links between the Moldovan state and a particular faith that constituted the violation of Article 9. 
The very limited nature of degree of separation between religion and state imposed by the ECtHR 
underlines how the Strasbourg Court will always struggle to fulfil the role of constitutional court for 
Europe. As noted above, while constitutional courts are often charged with upholding fundamental 
rights, they also have jurisdiction to protect fundamental principles of the legal and political order, 
such as separation of religion and state, the justification for which may not be solely rights-based. 
Because the Court of Human Rights, in contrast, has jurisdiction over rights issues alone, it can 
promote or restrict principles such as separation of religion and state only insofar as they impact on 
the protection of the rights in the Convention. Thus, the lack of a non-establishment clause in the 
ECHR means that the Court will intervene only when the degree of identification between the state 
and a faith becomes a threat to fundamental rights. The ECHR’s separation is a minimal one that can 
accommodate symbolic preference on the part of the state for a particular faith. Indeed, it is 
possible that, if the ruling religion’s theology was sufficiently liberal, the Convention may even be 
able to accommodate a rights-friendly theocracy.  
(b) Indirect Recognition of Non-Rights Based Reasons for Separation: Accommodating 
Constitutional Choices of Member States 
The limits on ECtHR’s ability to take account of non-rights based values and concerns are not 
absolute. The Strasbourg Court can indirectly rule on these matters in so far as Member States are 
entitled to rely on non-rights goals as grounds for justification for restriction of fundamental rights. 
To do so they must fit these goals into the text of the relevant Convention right which sets out 
permissible reasons to restrict the right in question. In relation to Article 9 (the most relevant article 
for our purposes), the relevant provision envisages that the right to freedom of religion can be 
restricted only ‘in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals 
or the rights and freedoms of others’.40 As will be discussed below, the narrow nature of these 
provisions poses problems for States who wish to rely on aims such as promotion of coexistence or 
political stability to justify restriction of religious expression in state contexts. 
Nevertheless in cases, where individuals have challenged state actions that restrict fundamental 
rights in order to uphold the secular nature of state bodies or institutions, the Court has been 
                                                          
40 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9(2). 
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broadly sympathetic to state attempts to combat theocratic movements and to measures that 
restrict the ability of individuals to wear religious symbols in particular contexts to protect the 
religious neutrality of state institutions. In Refah Partisi the Court upheld the dissolution of an 
Islamist political party that had been dissolved by the Turkish state on the grounds that it was ‘a 
centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism’.41 As the alleged breach of the Convention 
in this case arose out of the dissolution of a political party, the applicants in Refah actually brought 
their challenge under Article 11, the provision of the Convention that protects freedom of 
association. However, the grounds given by the Court for finding that a violation had not occurred 
were based on the threat the Court saw to Convention values from the theocratic political objectives 
attributed to the party so this case is highly relevant to the approach of the Strasbourg Court to the 
relationship between religion, state and law. In its judgement, the Grand Chamber of the Court 
stated that the dissolution of the party has a legitimate aim as secularism was ‘one of the 
fundamental principles of the State which are in harmony with the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and democracy’.42 Refah Partisi’s plan to introduce a religiously-based legal system 
was, it was held, ‘dangerous for the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.’43 Finally, it 
is very notable that the Court made what proved to be very controversial findings about the nature 
of Sharia and its compatibility with the ECHR stating:  
‘It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time 
supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly 
with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the 
way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts. ... In 
the Court’s view, a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a State 
party to the Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic 
ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention.’44  
Similarly, the Court has been sympathetic to state measures that seek to preserve the religious 
neutrality of particular state institutions. This has included a consistent refusal to find any violation 
of the Convention arising from the French version of secularism under which the principle of state 
religious neutrality is seen as requiring the absence of religious symbols from state institutions 
                                                          
41 Supra note 4, paragraph 12. 
42 Ibid. paragraph 93. 
43  Ibid paragraph 110. 
44 Ibid paragraph 123. 
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including those working for the state and in some cases such as state schools, users of state services. 
In the recent case of Ebrahimian v France45 the Court upheld the dismissal of a woman working as a 
temporary social assistant in a public psychiatric hospital who had refused to remove her headscarf 
at work. The Court recalled its previous caselaw under which it had found that ‘safeguarding the 
principle of secularism constitutes an objective that is in conformity with the values underlying the 
Convention’46 and that ‘States could invoke the principle of secularism and state neutrality to justify 
restrictions on the wearing of religious signs by civil servants…..it is their status as public agents that 
distinguishes them from ordinary citizens’47 The ruling in Ebrahimian is indeed consistent with the 
Court’s previous approach. In Dahlab v Switzerland48 it upheld a prohibition on a Muslim school 
teacher wearing her headscarf in class on the grounds the grounds that the state was entitled to 
require a policy of religious neutrality in its schools. In Şahin v Turkey49 it also upheld a policy 
preventing the wearing of headscarves in Turkish universities on the grounds on the grounds that 
other students may be pressurised into wearing such scarves if they were not generally banned. 
Notably, in both cases the Court again made highly controversial statements on the symbolic 
meaning of the headscarf, arguing in Dahlab that it was a symbol that it was ‘difficult to reconcile 
the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, 
equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their 
pupils’50 a statement in noted without disapproval in Şahin.51 Strasbourg is therefore very 
accommodating of the choice of Member States who wish to uphold a thick version of secularism 
and to exclude religious symbols from state contexts. It has not, however, by any means required 
such as separationist approach from signatory states. 
Reconciling the Promotion of Pragmatic Secularism with the Text of the Convention 
                                                          
45 Ebrahimian v France [2015] ECHR 1041. The majority judgement is in French. The dissenting opinions are in 
English. All translations from French are my own. 
46 Ibid. paragraph 53. 
47 Ibid. paragraph 64. 
48 Supra note 6. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Dahlab supra note 6. 
51 Şahin, supra note 6, paragraph 111. 
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As noted above, while the separation of religion and state required by the Strasbourg Court is one 
that relies solely on rights justifications, the same principle within national legal orders can be 
justified on a number of other grounds sourced from the overall constitutional order of the state 
some of which, such as the need to avoid religious contestation for political power, may not be 
solely rights-based. Not only has the Court generally found in favour of restrictions on fundamental 
rights that aim at upholding prinicples such as state neutrality or state secularism, it has explicitly 
stated that secularism (including its French and Turkish versions) is “compatible with the values 
underlying the Convention.”52 It noted in Şahin that it was necessary in societies where several 
religions to coexist to place restrictions on the expression of belief in some contexts in order to 
ensure coexistence and mutual respect.53 Thus, it has seemed to recognise that its interpretation of 
the rights contained in the ECHR can take account of principles such as broader coexistence rather 
than only focusing on the protection of particular rights as a justification for a measure that may 
restriction a fundamental right. Indeed, Trispiotis has noted how the Court has on various occasions 
invoked the attainment of goals such as mutual respect, toleration and solidarity as valid reasons for 
states to restrict rights, including freedom of religion.54 Such recognition of broader constitutional 
goals faces some textual difficulties. As noted above, the text of Article 9 envisages that the right to 
freedom of religion can be restricted only “in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others”.55 It can be difficult to see how 
broader constitutional principles that are not solely rights-based can be accommodated within this 
formulation. The idea that religious contestation for political power may prove particularly 
destabilising can perhaps be accommodated within the idea of “public order” but this involves 
stretching the term somewhat and the Court appears to have taken the approach of seeking to shoe-
horn such prinicples into the idea of defending the rights of others. In recent cases such as Şahin and 
Ebrahimian the ECtHR has been willing to uphold restrictions on religious expression in cases in 
circumstances where, as dissenting judgements noted in each case, there was little concrete 
evidence of impact upon others.56 Indeed the most recent ruling in this area in Ebrahimian has been 
                                                          
52 Ebrahimian supra note 45, paragraph 53, Refah Partisi supra note 4, paragraph 93. 
53 Şahin,supra note 6, paragraph 107. 
54 I Trispiotis, Freedom of Religion, Equality and Discrimination in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(PhD Thesis, University College London, 2016) 168-74. 
55 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9(2). 
56 See the partially dissenting opinion of Judge O’Leary in Ebrahimian,  note 45 supra. and the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Tulkens in Şahin, note 6 supra. 
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criticised for failing to be fully frank about the reality that, in finding in favour of the French State, 
the Court effectively gave scope to states to pursue (through the principle of strict secularism) goals 
such as ‘peaceful coexistence’ that were not directly aimed at protecting the rights of others while at 
the same time claiming that the action of the French authorities was one which aimed at defending 
the rights of others.57  
To summarise, the Strasbourg Court’s approach to cases relating to the relationship between 
religion, state and law is heavily affected by its rights-focus. This is seen when it is required to assess 
the compatibility of policies adopted by states, such as France or Turkey, that pursue (or pursued) a 
thick version of secularism that may aim to achieve goals that are not only rights-focused.  Even 
though the Court has given wide latitude to states in such cases it has only been able to do so by 
stretching the concept of the protection of the rights of others. This rights focus, coupled with the 
fact that the text of the Convention provides limited scope for restricting rights on the basis of 
abstract constitutional principles means that the Court has has had to shoe-horn the defence of 
abstract secularism into the concept of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others as in 
(Ebrahimian and Sahin) or has had to identify threats to rights in the challenges to secularist norms 
mounted by those who seek a more assertive or visible religious presence in politics or state 
contexts (Dahlab, Refah Partisi). However, this identification of threats leads the Court into highly 
problematic territory to which I now turn.  
Rights-Focus and Assessment of the Substance of Religious Beliefs 
As it has felt it necessary to seek justification for secularist state measures in rights terms, and as it 
can only intervene to require limits on state identification with a particular faith when such 
identification can be shown to be oppressive of fundamental rights, the Strasbourg Court has been 
led into offering assessments of the degree to which the beliefs or claims of particular faiths (usually 
Islam) are or are not compatible with fundamental rights.  
This has meant that the Court has often been drawn into assessments of whether particular religious 
beliefs can be seen as compatible with values such as gender equality, democracy, privacy, human 
dignity etc. We see therefore that when it sought to justify the decision of the Turkish authorities to 
dissolve an Islamist political party in Refah Partisi v Turkey, the Court found it necessary to identify a 
threat to the rights of others in the political programme of the party in question. This led the Grand 
Chamber to argue (controversially) that sharia law is incompatible with democracy by virtue of its 
                                                          
57 Ronan McCrea, Secularism before the Strasbourg Court: Abstract Constitutional Principles as a Basis for 
Limiting Rights 74(6) Mod.L. Rev. 79(4) 691, 700. 
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immutable nature and because it may violate human rights such as the prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading treatment (due to the criminal punishments it envisages), privacy rights (due to its 
regulation of the private and intimate sphere) and equality (due to its rules relating to the treatment 
of women).58 In a similar vein, in Dahlab v Switzerland59 and Şahin v Turkey60 the Court made 
reference, as noted above, to the headscarf being a symbol that was hard to reconcile with gender 
equality. Such assessment of the substance of particular religious beliefs is highly dangerous territory 
for a court to enter into and, unsurprisingly, it has brought criticism (most often in relation to 
stereotyping of Islam and Sharia).61  
The statements of the Court in cases such as Refah Partisi, Dahlab and Şahin have been heavily 
criticised on grounds that they essentialise Islam and Sharia and that they attribute a single meaning 
to the headscarf when it may be worn for a variety of reasons.62 It is also true that European 
institutions more generally may be guilty of adopting an un-justifiably uncritical assumption that 
adherents to Christian faiths accept the secular nature of the ‘rules of the game’ while subjecting 
Muslims to more rigorous testing of their secular bona fides.63 
However, the correctness of the court’s analysis of Islam in these cases and the degree to which such 
statements can be problematic in the light of undoubted societal discrimination against Muslims in 
Europe, are important questions but they are not the focus of this paper. What is significant for our 
purposes is to think why the Court has entered into assessment of the substance of religious beliefs 
which so many courts studiously avoid and which its own Article 9 jurisprudence counsels against 
(the Court has repeatedly said in Article 9 cases that it is impermissible for the state to ‘assess the 
legitimacy of religious beliefs’).64 While the Court is not assessing religious legitimacy or truth in 
these cases, it is offering particular interpretations of the beliefs of a faith (as task secular courts are 
                                                          
58 [2003] ECHR 87, paragraph 123. 
59 Supra. note 6. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See for example Carolyn Evans, The Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights (2006) 7 Melb. J. of 
Int. Law 52. 
62 DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGION - THE ISLAMIC HEADSCARF DEBATE IN EUROPE, (2006). 
63 MCCREA, note 2 supra at ch. 6.  
64 See for instance, the statement in Refah Partisi v Turkey (supra note 4) at paragraph 91. 
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poorly equipped to carry out) and assessing whether such interpretations conform to human rights 
norms. The Strasbourg Court’s dangerous forays into assessment of the compatibility of particular 
religious beliefs comes, I suggest, from the fact that, unlike the US Supreme Court, it is interpreting a 
text that lacks a non-establishment clause and that provides limited grounds for justifying state 
restrictions of fundamental rights largely on grounds other than the protection of other fundamental 
rights.  
Summary: The Features of A Rights-Based Justification of Separation 
These cases show us what separation which draws its justification from the need to protect 
fundamental rights and which has a limited capacity to draw justification from broader non-rights 
based goals looks like. Being very restricted in its ability to draw on broader constitutional principles, 
the ECtHR’s version of separation is characterised by a very limited mandatory degree of separation 
(it precludes only oppressive entanglement) and pressure to engage in controversial assessments of 
the substance of religious beliefs in order to verify whether the religion in question may represent a 
threat to fundamental rights if given a significant public role. 
The rights-centred approach of Strasbourg, as noted above, makes the ECtHR’s jurisprudence a 
valuable tool for those interested in the question of what role rights can and cannot play in the 
justification of the principle of separation of religion and state. Denied the possibility of directly 
drawing on broader constitutional principles and goals in the way a national constitutional court 
could do, the Strasbourg Court can impose on States only the degree of separation required to 
prevent entanglement of state and religion from taking rather extreme forms that are actually 
oppressive of religious freedom. Even when it can take indirect account of such broader principles 
(in cases where States plead broader goals as justifications for policies restricting religious 
expression in particular contexts), the limited recognition of abstract or pragmatic political goals 
such as coexistence as valid grounds to restrict religious freedom in the text of Article 9 means that 
the Court has been drawn into seeking to identify threats to fundamental rights from particular 
faiths.  
By providing a ‘laboratory conditions’ where issues of separation of religion and state can be 
examined through a fundamental rights lense with other broader constitutional principles largely 
excluded, the Strasbourg caselaw shows particularly clearly what work rights do and do not do in 
this area as well as the potential problems of according rights questions too much importance in our 
analysis of these issues as they arise in national legal orders that are not subject to the jurisdictional 
and textual limits of the ECtHR.  
18 
 
This is an important issue for US constitutional law. The First Amendment contains both a 
fundamental rights element (free exercise of religion) and an abstract constitutional principle (non-
establishment) and the degree to which the latter relies on the former for its justification has not 
always been clear. In addition, some leading proponents of reading the First Amendment as 
imposing a stringent obligation of religious neutrality on the state have argued for this position on 
the basis that entanglement of religion and state violates fundamental rights, a position which the 
outcome of the fundamental rights focused rulings of the Strasbourg Court renders questionable. 
 
US Approach: Entanglement v Right to Equal Treatment or Not to Feel Alienated 
There has been an enormous volume of jurisprudence and scholarship in relation to the 
requirements and underlying rationale of the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment.65 
My purpose is to focus on one element of these debates, the use of rights as a justification for such 
separation and the negative consequences of such use for those who advocate maximal state 
neutrality in relation to religion. The first thing to note is that that US Supreme Court has, in general, 
mandated a far greater degree of separation than the ECtHR. It has held that states should not 
appear to symbolically endorse any particular faith and has, until recently at least, not required that 
a symbolic endorsement appear to be oppressive for it to be unconstitutional. It has also 
strengthened adherence to the principle that a distinction ought to be maintained between religion 
and law by requiring that legislation be justified by valid secular reasons as part of its overall view 
that the First Amendment precludes excessive “entanglement” of religion and state.  
In the famous Lemon decision66 the Court held that the First Amendment precluded the government 
from either advancing or hindering religion and rendered unconstitutional any measures involving 
excessive “entanglement” between government and religion. It justified this conclusion on the basis 
that political division along religious lines risked fragmentation and divisiveness and was one of the 
evils the First Amendment sought to prevent. Notably, this is a justification that relies not on 
showing violation of the rights of any individual but on a principle about how best to share a single 
set of political institutions in a religiously-diverse society. The “Lemon Test“ has proved controversial 
but the view that separation draws much of its justification from pragmatic or prudential views on 
                                                          
65 Some recent notable examples include Micah Schwartzmann, What if Religion Is Not Special? 79 U. CHI. L. 
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the consequences of religious politics and not just from issues of individual rights can be seen at 
various stages through the years, notably in the concurring opinion of O’Connor J in McCreary 
County v ACLU where she invoked the conflict caused by failure to separate religion and state 
elsewhere in the world to justify restrictions on symbolic endorsement of religion by the state. She 
stated:  
‘At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious 
authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional 
boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private religious exercise to 
flourish.[…] Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must therefore 
answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that has 
served others so poorly?’67  
On this view, failing to maintain separation of religion and state risks political instability and possibly 
violence. Characterising the aim of separation of religion and state in this way means it is 
unnecessary to investigate whether the religion alleged to have been endorsed by the state has 
beliefs that are or are not compatible with fundamental rights as it is the erosion of the boundary 
between religion and state per se, rather than (as in Refah) any rights-limiting ambitions of any 
particular faith that is problematic for the Court. 
Focusing on the danger of religious politics rather than rights violations allows the Court to find even 
relatively trivial instances of state endorsement unconstitutional. In Stone v Graham68 the Court 
found unconstitutional a Kentucky statute mandating the display of the Ten Commandments in 
public schools on the ground that it lacked a valid secular purpose. The Court made it clear that it 
was irrelevant that the presence of the commandments was not accompanied by obligations to 
participate in prayer or other religious activities, noting that ‘it is no defence to urge that the 
religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment.’69 In 
Allegheny County v Greater Pittsburgh ACLU Blackmun J noted that the test was "the challenged 
governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling 
denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a disapproval, of their individual 
religious choices." 70 In these cases the court found that displays of religious symbols could be 
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unconstitutional if they were seen as endorsement of a religions by the state without needing to 
investigate whether such endorsement was oppressive of the religious freedom of others.  
The Court has stressed that the test is not a rigid or absolute one and was willing to uphold a 
municipal nativity scene in Lynch v Donnelly on the grounds that, ‘whatever benefit there is to one 
faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental’ and that the authorities had ‘a 
secular purpose for including the crèche (…) [had] not impermissibly advanced religion, and (…) [did] 
not create excessive entanglement between religion and government.’71 But, even on occasions 
when religiously-specific displays have been upheld, this was justified the basis of a framework of 
analysis that saw non-establishment as having a justification relating to avoiding entanglement of 
religion and state that was, by itself, sufficient to trigger a finding of unconstitutionality without it 
being necessary to consider whether the non-establishment in question was in some way oppressive 
of fundamental rights such as religious freedom. On this approach, symbolic governmental 
endorsement of a religion that was oppressive of the religious freedom of others would certainly be 
unconstitutional, but non-oppressive endorsement would also be unconstitutional as it would 
‘entangle’ religion and state and could lead to conflict between faiths for control of the 
governmental institutions which could engage in such endorsement.  Such a view of the justification 
of the underlying justification of the First Amendment is contrast to the approach of the ECtHR in 
cases such as Lautsi where an oppressive effect of the symbolic endorsement had to be shown. 
It should be noted that different judges and sometimes the same judge,72 have, at different times, 
offered differing justifications for an interpretation of the First Amendment that requires a maximal 
degree of state neutrality. There have been many critics who have argued that the whole approach 
of requiring neutrality is, in the US context, ahistorical and wrong in principle.73 However, for my 
purposes I would like to focus not on those who oppose the idea of maximal state neutrality but on 
those who have argued in favour of separation on the basis of fundamental rights rather than non-
rights based principles such as the imprudence of permitting religiously-based contestation for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
70 Allegheny County v Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 
71 Lynch v Donnelly 465 U.S. 668, Judgment of Burger CJ. 
72 The approach of O’Connor J in Lynch v Donnelly (ibid) focused more on the sense of alienation that symbolic 
state endorsement of religion would cause in contrast to her invocation of the instability that may be caused 
by religious contestation for state power in Allegheny County (ibid). 
73 See, for example, the dissent of Scalia J in McCreary County, note 67 supra. 
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political power. I want to do so in order to show that rights-based arguments in favour of separation 
are flawed and ultimately undermine the cause of separation. 
Rights-Based Defences of Non-Establishment 
The idea that separation can be justified on the basis of an individual right has surfaced both in the 
caselaw and in leading academic defences of separation. In the same opinion in which she cited the 
dangers of political instability and violence in finding the display of the Ten Commandments in a 
courthouse was unconstitutional (McCreary County) O’Connor J went on to link the idea of 
separation to individual rights and religious freedom saying: 
‘When we enforce these restrictions, we do so for the same reason that guided the Framers–respect 
for religion’s special role in society. Our Founders conceived of a Republic receptive to voluntary 
religious expression, and provided for the possibility of judicial intervention when government 
action threatens or impedes such expression. Voluntary religious belief and expression may be as 
threatened when government takes the mantle of religion upon itself as when government directly 
interferes with private religious practices. When the government associates one set of religious 
beliefs with the state and identifies non-adherents as outsiders, it encroaches upon the individual’s 
decision about whether and how to worship’.74 
It may be that some degree of separation is required both by the pragmatic aim of avoiding 
intractable political conflict and the aim of protecting freedom of religion. However, as the ECtHR 
jurisprudence shows, very different levels of separation will be required by each aim. Remember 
that in McCreary County the governmental action which O Connor J found unconstitutional was the 
display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse. This may cause non-Christians to feel like 
outsiders but it is difficult to see how it would meaningfully interfere with their “decision about how 
and whether to worship” anymore than Government endorsement of the goal of a clean 
environment affects the ability of an individual to hold views or organize campaigns that reject the 
idea of government regulation of industry. Indeed, given the significant legal protection for freedom 
of religion that exists in the United States,75 the likelihood that an individual would be forced to 
change her beliefs because of the display of such a sign in a courthouse must be even lower. 
O’Connor J’s concern about citizens feeling themselves to be religious outsiders (which appears to 
have much in common with Laws LJ’s worries, in the British context, about people being “less than 
                                                          
74 note 67 supra. opinion of O’Connor J. 
75 Most notably the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16, 
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full citizens” or being “left out in the cold”) is also seen in her opinion in Lynch v Donnelly where she 
argued that symbolic endorsement is unconstitutional on the basis that "sends a message to non-
adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community".76 One can also see Blackmun J’s statement in Allegheny County as sourcing the duty of 
neutrality in an individual right not to have the state express “disapproval” of one’s religious choices.  
This individual and rights-focused approach has been strengthened by the academic works of leading 
American constitutional theorists who favour separation of religion and state. Dworkin’s recent work 
argues for separation of religion and state on the basis of a general right to ethical independence 
held by all individuals and by the duty of the state to treat all its citizens with equal concern and 
respect.77 For Dworkin, symbolic endorsement of a faith by the state fails to demonstrate equal 
concern and respect towards citizens who do not share that faith. Other leading pro-separation such 
as Sager and Eisgruber (who characterise establishment of a faith as creating classes of outsiders and 
as involving disparagement of those who do not share that faith)78 and Nussbaum79 have similarly 
sought to justify prohibitions on any symbolic endorsement of a faith by the state on grounds of the 
potential hurt feelings or sense of exclusion that an individual of a minority faith may feel if they see 
symbolic association of the state with a particular faith.  
Though such an approach appears to mandate maximal symbolic neutrality, it ultimately undermines 
the case for such neutrality the separation of church and state by locating its justification in a rights 
claim that is weak. As Laborde has pointed out, hurt feelings or a sense that the state does not share 
one’s values are inevitable parts of democratic life. 80 Indeed, those who believe in rigid gender roles, 
racial inequality, dictatorship, parliamentary government or pacifism will all feel alienated by the US 
constitution or the symbols of the US government. Nussbaum’s assertion that ‘the careful neutrality 
that a liberal state should observe in matters of religious and comprehensive doctrine does not 
extend to the fundamentals of its own conception’81 does not answer the question of why such 
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fundamentals may not be religious in nature when religious norms may be liberal and when non-
religious fundamentals may be as deeply felt and may produce equal levels of alienation from those 
who do not share them. Nagel (amongst others) argues that,82 ‘disagreements about justice are just 
as fierce disputes and intractable as disagreements about religion’. Indeed, the world provides many 
examples of instances where other forms of cleavage, such as language in Belgium or national 
identity in Northern Ireland, have been sufficiently deep and intractable that the political system 
requires that such disputes be parked and that state institutions remain “neutral” on these divides. 
More importantly for our purposes, none of these theorists shown why there should be a right to 
have the state avoid expressing disagreement with your religious (or other beliefs) or why 
expression on the part of a state of religious belief amounts to a violation of a right to equality (or 
any other recognised fundamental right). States embrace a range of beliefs and values such as 
gender equality, racial equality, rejection of monarchy or freedom of religion that may be alienating 
to some who hold different views.  There is no recognised human right not to feel alienated, not to 
hear particular kinds of arguments in political life or not to see particular symbols in state contexts. 
As the result in Lautsi showed, to rise to the level of actual threats to fundamental rights, symbolic 
links on the part of the state to a particular faith need to be sufficiently intense to become 
oppressive of a recognised right such as freedom of religion or parental autonomy in relation to the 
upbringing of children.  
The dangers in a rights-focused approach for those who favour separation is seen in the recent case 
of Town of Greece v Galloway.83  In this case, Kennedy J, writing for the majority, articulated a test 
for regulating prayer in state contexts that moves closer to the focus on oppression seen in Lautsi, 
Dimitras and Buscarini and away from the idea of avoiding any (even slight) entanglement. In my 
view this is not the correct approach but is a logical conclusion of the growth in the academic and 
judicial focus on non-establishment as a matter of rights. In this case the majority upheld the 
practice of opening meetings of the town council with a sectarian prayer (in practice almost always 
Christian). Kennedy J adopted an approach that identified the test for constitutionality as one 
focused on ‘impermissible coercion’. He argued that ‘legislative bodies do not engage in 
impermissible coercion by merely exposing constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and in 
which they need not participate’.  Only if the prayers ‘denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, 
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threaten damnation, or preach conversion’ or if the prayer giver were chosen in a discriminatory 
way, might they become unconstitutional.84 
Although this approach was heavily criticised by advocates of separation, if the main justification for 
the religious neutrality of the State is to protect individual rights, then Kennedy J is correct. There is 
no fundamental individual right under the US Constitution not to be confronted in public life with 
statements or symbols with which one disagrees. Once coercion that might impinge on a protected 
right such as free speech or freedom of religion is not shown, no fundamental rights have been 
violated by a brief voluntary prayer, therefore such prayer is constitutional. By making individual 
rights central to debate on the requirement of the religious neutrality of the separationists such as 
Dworkin and Nussbuam have moved the legal argument onto a terrain which is highly unfavourable 
to their goals. This is where the European example is particularly instructive. If Town of Greece were 
a European case, say taken by an individual against Orthodox prayers before a municipal meeting in 
the country of Greece, the applicant would lose. The similarity of Kennedy J’s analysis to that of the 
ECtHR Grand Chamber in Lautsi is striking. The Strasbourg Court upheld the presence of the ‘passive 
symbol’ of the crucifix in classrooms noting that it was not accompanied by proselytism or 
denigration of other faiths85 just as Kennedy J had noted the absence of proselytising or denigration 
of minority faiths in Town of Greece. Strasbourg was right to approach the decision in Lautsi on the 
basis that it is a court whose mission is to protect rights. As it interprets a charter that lacks a non-
establishment clause, the ECtHR found that it could reject claims based on non-oppressive symbolic 
endorsement of a faith by the state. However, the same is not true of the United States where the 
Constitution has a broader remit than fundamental rights protection and where there is an explicit 
non-establishment clause. Kennedy J is wrong in the US for the reasons that he would have been 
right in Europe. His judgement in Town of Greece and the rights-focused arguments of Dworkin, 
Nussbaum and others seek to use ideas of rights to justify what is best justified on grounds other 
than rights.  
The Weakness Rights as Justifications for the Secular Nature of the State 
Rights, therefore provide limited support to the fundamental pillars of the secular state: the 
requirements that laws be justified by secular public reasons and that the state not endorse any 
particular faith. Laborde’s critique of Dworkin is correct in suggesting that there is no fundamental 
right to not to have the state express disagreement with your views or not to hear particular 
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arguments in political debate. Fundamental rights only come in when the degree of identification by 
the state with a faith becomes oppressive of rights that are recognised such as freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. As Ahdar and Leigh rightly argue86 and as the caselaw of the ECtHR suggests, 
whether or not it is fair or desirable, mild establishment of a particular faith is compatible with 
religious liberty. This is not to say that the ‘wall of separation’ should be torn down. As sectarian 
strife in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere shows, there may be very strong, non-rights based reasons for 
such a wall. Most of these reasons rely on the idea that religion is disruptive of political cooperation 
to a greater degree than other forms of cleavage. For those who hold this view (which has been 
disputed by figures such as Armstrong and Cavanaugh),87 if politics are religiously-influenced or if a 
faith has the prospect of using the state to promote its interests political cooperation and the assent 
of minorities to majority decisions are likely to be imperilled. Accordingly, religion should be kept 
separate from politics and the state to avoid intractable political division, and the instability and 
violence it may bring.88  
We therefore come back to prudential or pragmatic justifications for separation. Justifications that 
draw on the historical development of the idea of secular politics which, as Mark Lilla’s great work 
The Stillborn God shows,89 a reaction to the destructiveness of religious contestation for political 
power. This approach has some support in the work of Rawls in that he also acknowledged that 
separation began as a modus vivendi to limit the conflict caused by religious contestation for 
political power (though he suggested, less convincingly to my mind, that it had developed into an 
ethical principle that it is illegitimate for the state to legislatively promote particular conceptions of 
the good).90 Maximal separation in the West therefore can also be justified not by rights claims but 
by the fact that predominant forms of religion in Western states combine a number factors make 
religion particularly destabilising politically.  In other words, because religion is identity as well as 
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belief, because such identity is usually fixed, because it often seeks to regulate all areas of life and 
because its reasoning is often relatively inaccessible to those outside the faith, it is particularly 
politically destabilising in a way in which other forms of identity or belief that lack this combination 
of factors are not.91 
Viewed in this way, trivial instances of state endorsement of a faith in a school are not problematic 
because they violate the rights of students or parents but because they risk competition amongst 
religious groups to control the education system in order to use it to promote their faith. Similarly, 
using religious arguments in law-making is problematic not because the majorities cannot force 
people to take or refrain from particular actions (this happens regularly for non-religious reasons). 
Instead it is to be avoided because it undermines the ethic of citizenship, represents a failure to 
internalize the legitimacy and permanence of religious difference and undermines the idea of the 
law-making arena as a place where we make an effort to transcend religious differences thus 
undermining the incentives for political minorities to accept the legislative verdicts of a religious 
majority. Allowing a particular faith to play a symbolic or other role in state bodies, in other words, 
undermines the ability of such institutions to institutionalise cooperation amongst a population of 
diverse religious views and identities. Indeed, many who favour granting religion a broad social role 
reject the idea of state establishment of faith on the basis that connection to the state risks sapping 
the vitality or imperilling the religious freedom of the faith so established.92 A full defense of such 
principles would require a monograph so it is not my intention to set out the full case in favour of 
separation here but rather to show that such non-rights justifications exist and that they do not 
suffer from the inherent inability to control minor violations of state neutrality that apply to rights-
based justifications. 
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approach permits the cognitive dissonance that permits individuals, for example to vote in favour of legal 
toleration of that which may be religiously forbidden without abandoning their religious identity. Full 
treatment of this argument and the question of the definition of religion are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Conclusion 
The jurisprudence of a rights court such as the ECtHR which deals with issues of freedom of religion 
and the separation of religion and state in the absence of a non-establishment clause can provide a 
useful perspective for the USSC on the true goals underpinning the non-establishment part of the 
First Amendment. This lesson is that rights-based justifications for non-establishment are weak and 
ultimately (as in Town of Greece) undermine the principle of non-establishment.  
One of the valuable features of US jurisprudence (no doubt linked to presence of a non-
establishment clause) is the absence of judicial opining on the compatibility of the substance of the 
beliefs of particular religious traditions with liberal democracy. The ECtHR has been right to see that 
religion taking over the state can be oppressive and to state that secularism is a principle which is in 
line with the democratic and liberal values of the ECHR. Post-Lautsi, it is also clear that the Court 
recognises that, given its narrow, rights-focused mandate, mild non-oppressive forms of 
establishment, whether or not they are desirable (or wise in a diversifying religious context) are not 
for the Court to disturb. 
At the same time, the Strasbourg Court must develop tools to allow its rights-focused approach to 
take adequate account of the non-rights based but legitimate reasons which may underpin 
restrictions on religious expression in particular contexts in order to preserve the religious neutrality 
of the state. Moreover, it needs to do so in ways that avoid the kind of pronouncements on the 
substantive beliefs of particular faiths that were seen in Refah, Shahin and Dahlab. Therefore rather 
than identifying the Islamic headscarf as hard to reconcile with gender equality as it did in Dahlab, it 
could restrict itself to noting that a desire to have a school system characterised by religious 
neutrality is legitimate. There are some positive signs in this regard. In SAS v France (which, it should 
be noted, related to an extreme religious symbol in social life rather than the relationship between 
religion and the state) the Court managed to avoid attributing particular meanings to the Islamic 
face-veil and instead upheld the French prohibition on the public wearing of such garments on the 
basis that the State had the power ‘secure the conditions whereby individuals can live together in 
their diversity’.93 The decision in Ebrahimian v France was also notable for its lack of any statements 
by the judges attributing particular meanings to the headscarf. The Ebrahimian judgment also 
appeared give scope to states to pursue policies such as French-style state secularism whose aims 
are not solely rights based but also seek to promote coexistence and political stability by setting 
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down rules that aim to allow a religiously-diverse population to share a single set of state 
institutions.94 
In both SAS and Ebrahimian the majority decision was criticised by the dissenting judges on the basis 
that recognising abstract principles risked allowing restriction of religious freedom on grounds that 
are overly vague95 and in Ebrahimian the court appears not to have been fully upfront about the fact 
that it was in fact allowing abstract principles to restrict fundamental rights. Other critics have rightly 
noted the danger for minority rights of allowing fundamental rights to be restricted on grounds 
other than protecting rights and freedoms.96 The dissenting judges are right that the majority’s 
reading of this term is strained. However, it is necessary to consider whether any other approach is 
possible.97 Whether the approach of the French authorities in this case was or was not 
proportionate, our life together is about more than the rights that we hold against each other and, 
as noted above, there are important principles that underpin liberal democratic life that are very 
imperfectly translated into rights terms. There are non-rights factors that rights-protecting courts 
must be free to take into account. Advocates of strict separation in the US would do well to take 
note of the European experience. Unlike those who litigate on the basis of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, US lawyers have in their Constitution a document whose interpretation can go 
beyond issues of rights and may therefore provide a much sounder basis for judicial protection of 
maximal state neutrality than the rights-based arguments that have been so prominent in recent 
times. 
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